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The Birth and Transposition of a New 
Approach to Public Forum Doctrine 
 
by Brett G. Johnson1 
   Shane C. Epping 
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces and explores the concept of forum delegation: the 
power of government officials to suggest which forums to allow speakers to 
use. The concept is born out of a recent legal battle between the University 
of Minnesota and conservative speaker Ben Shapiro, in which the UMN 
required Shapiro to speak in a venue away from the heart of campus due to 
concerns over the school’s ability to provide adequate security for the event. 
The paper first analyzes the UMN case to assess the constitutionality of 
forum delegation in the context of regulating speech and public universities. 
Next, it applies Robert Post’s theory of constitutional domains to transpose 
forum delegation from the public university context to situations in which 
cities must deal with controversial speakers. The goal in explicating the 
concept of forum delegation within this latter context to is give cities a tool 
in which to constitutionally balance the interests of speakers, audience 
members, public safety concerns, and efficient resource management. Such 
a tool can be especially helpful at a time when provocateurs have sought to 







1.   Brett G. Johnson (MA, University of Iowa; PhD, University of Minnesota) is an 
assistant professor of journalism studies at the University of Missouri. His research focuses 
on the intersection of mass communication law and media sociology. Shane C. Epping (MA, 
University of Missouri) is a Ph.D. student at the University of Missouri. His research 
focuses on media sociology and journalism ethics. 
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Introduction 
In December 2017, officials at the University of Minnesota (UMN) 
approved the application of a politically conservative student organization to 
bring the well-known conservative speaker Ben Shapiro to campus to give a 
speech. However, UMN officials stipulated that Shapiro’s speech must be 
held in an auditorium located on the school’s smaller and more suburban St. 
Paul campus rather than in a larger venue on the school’s larger and more 
urban Minneapolis campus.2 Shapiro came and spoke on the St. Paul campus 
on February 26, 2018. In July 2018, the student group (Students for a 
Conservative Voice, or SCV) and the national organization that financed 
Shapiro’s speech (Young America’s Foundation, or YAF) brought a federal 
lawsuit against several UMN officials, alleging that the moving of Shapiro’s 
speech to St. Paul amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.3 
In February 2019, Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Minnesota held that several of SCV’s and YAF’s claims could 
go to trial.4  Both parties failed to reach a settlement following a conference 
in August 2019.5 
Over the last decade or so, the debate over controversial figures 
speaking at public colleges and universities has gravitated toward whether 
schools must allow these figures to speak on campus at all.6 Less attention 
has focused on the debate over how public colleges and universities can 
allow controversial figures to speak on campus. Therefore, the UMN case 
offers scholars the opportunity to shift this peripheral part of the debate to 
the center of the discussion over controversial speakers on college campuses. 
The UMN’s handling of the Shapiro speech is not completely unique: in 
early 2018, Michigan State University agreed to allow white nationalist 
Richard Spencer to speak in a large agricultural facility (essentially, a barn) 
a mile-and-a-half south of the southern edge of its main campus.7 MSU 
 
 2.  Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967, 977 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 
2019). 
 3.  Complaint at 2, Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, No. 018-cv-01864 
(SRN/HB), 2018 WL 3321944 (D. Minn. July 3, 2018) (Trial Pleading). 
 4.  Young America’s Foundation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967 at 974; see infra Part I.A.   
 5.  Second Amended Complaint, Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, No. 18-cv-
1864 (SRN/HB), 2019 WL 936663 (D. Minn. Sep. 13, 2019). 
 6.  See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof and Kenneth Waltzer, Free Speech, Campus Safety, or 
Both, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. (Sept. 15, 2017); Daniel Henninger, The Free-Speech Wars, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2017), at A17; Gary Pavela, Only Speech Codes Should Be Censored, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. (Dec. 1, 2006). 
 7.  Sarah Brown, Richard Spencer Will Speak at Michigan State—Way Out on a Farm, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Richard-Spen cer-
Will-Speak-at/242684 (around “three dozen” people attended the event, though it is not clear 
whether that was due to the venue’s location); see R.J. Wolcott, White Nationalist Richard 
Spencer Blames Violent Protesters for Small Crowd at MSU, LANSING STATE J. (Mar. 5, 
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officials stated that scheduling Spencer in this venue was meant to 
“minimize[] the risk of violence or disruption to campus.”8 However, as of 
this writing, Spencer has not taken any legal action against MSU regarding 
the school’s selection of a peripheral venue, unlike YAF in the UMN case. 
The UMN case also offers something more for First Amendment 
scholars to debate about outside of the realm of free speech on public 
colleges and universities. It gives scholars the opportunity to reassess public 
forum doctrine in the context of how other government entities (namely 
cities and towns) that contain multiple public forums of various categories 
(traditional, designated, limited and nonpublic) can manage how they 
delegate the use of these forums to extreme speakers in a constitutionally 
sound manner. For instance, less than a week prior to the August 2017 Unite 
the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA that turned violent and led to the death 
of a counter-protester, the city of Charlottesville had sought to move the rally 
from the smaller Emancipation Park to a much larger public park out of a 
concern for its ability to manage public safety in a more confined space.9 The 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted rally 
organizer Jason Kessler injunctive relief, finding the city’s attempt to move 
the event to be viewpoint discrimination.10 The UMN case could offer the 
theoretical (if not doctrinal) groundwork upon which to construct a principle 
of “forum delegation” that broader categories of state actors could rely on 
when faced with the issue of managing extreme speakers who seek to use 
public forums. 
This paper uses the UMN case as an analytical lens for highlighting the 
major issues involved with the notion of forum delegation, first as it applies 
to public colleges and universities and subsequently as it could apply to 
municipalities. Part one of the paper reviews the full set of facts from the 
UMN case and the legal arguments of both parties. Each of these issues will 
then be addressed in turn by focusing on relevant case law. These issues 
include: the categorization of the forum in the case and the resulting standard 
of review;11 the nature of the university’s mission and how it applies to the 
standard of review;12 the university’s interest in maintaining security 
surrounding the speech, and the constitutional boundaries of that interest;13 




 8.  Id. 
 9.  Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No. 17-CV-00056, WL 3474071 (W.D. Vir. Aug. 
11, 2017) at *1. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See infra Part I.B. 
 12.  See infra Part I.C. 
 13.  See infra Part I.D. 
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administrators to discriminate on the basis of the content of Shapiro’s 
speech;14 and whether the St. Paul venue amounted to an ample alternative 
channel for Shapiro’s speech.15 Alongside relevant case law, examples from 
other public universities’ speech policies will be introduced where 
appropriate to highlight common trends among policies and how they reflect 
current precedent. The aim of this section is to lay the doctrinal groundwork 
for explicating the concept of forum delegation as it may apply to broader 
categories of state actors. One could contend that it may appear backward 
logic to begin the analysis within a specific category of public forums and 
expanding it out to broader categories (not to mention forums that trigger 
higher levels of constitutional review), and an explication of this concept of 
forum delegation more appropriately come from a top-down analysis of 
public forum doctrine as a whole. However, it is argued here that the key 
issues at play in the UMN case are not endogenous to the university setting, 
and furthermore they touch upon an array of concerns related to public forum 
doctrine as a whole. 
Part two of the paper assesses the notion of forum delegation using 
various strands of First Amendment theory. In particular, this section relies 
on Professor Robert Post’s concept of constitutional domains as a useful 
theoretical framework propping up the notion of forum delegation as 
constitutionally sound doctrine. Part three of the paper offers a prototypical 
legal framework that could be used when state actors such as municipalities 
seek to delegate the use of public forums when confronted with extreme 
speakers. This section offers several hypothetical scenarios to frame the 
boundaries of this concept. 
 
I. The UMN Case 
A. Facts of the Case 
The facts of the case begin with SCV requesting in the fall of 2017 to 
bring Ben Shapiro to UMN to give a speech on campus on February 26, 
2018. Because the speech was expected to attract a large audience and 
require a substantial amount of security, the UMN Assistant Director of 
Student Unions and Activities, Eric Dussault, told SCV that the speech 
would be subject to the university’s large-scale event policy (LSEP).16 This 
policy required a student organization to fill out an application describing 
aspects of the event, including the anticipated number of attendees, how 
ticketing will be managed, how the event will be promoted, how the event 
will be financed, and (perhaps most importantly for the facts of this case) 
 
 14.  See infra Part I.E. 
 15.  See infra Part I.F. 
 16.  Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967, 976 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 
2019). 
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anticipated security issues or concerns about the impact of the event on the 
campus community.17 In completing this application, SCV requested several 
of the university’s largest auditoriums on its main Minneapolis campus to 
hold the event, including a 455-seat auditorium in Mayo Hall and a 1,056-
seat auditorium in Willey Hall.18 The latter, the group’s preferred location, 
had been a venue in the recent past for speeches by (more liberal) speakers 
such as Supreme Court Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, 
U.S. Senators Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Amy Klobuchar and Al 
Franken, and former U.S. Vice-President Walter Mondale.19 SCV alleged 
that they urged in their application that UMN officials grant their application 
for one of these venues because officials had moved a prior SCV event 
featuring conservative commentator Lauren Southern to what SCV 
considered an undesirable venue.20 
In late December 2017, UMN Chief of Police Matthew Clark sent an 
email to SCV saying that pursuant to the LSEP, “the admin has asked that 
we try to move this visit to the St. Paul campus. It’s going to be a security 
issue with past lectures at other universities.”21 In later emails to SCV, 
Dussault and UMN Police Lieutenant Troy Buhta elaborated on the security 
concern, saying that it would difficult for security officials to secure a 
skyway that connected the Willey Hall auditorium to surrounding 
buildings.22 UMN officials officially approved SCV to use the St. Paul 
campus’ North Star Ballroom, which could seat 400-500 people, for the 
Shapiro speech.23 In late January 2018, SCV sought to again reserve Willey 
Hall for the speech and requested more information on why officials had 
denied them use of the venue in the first place. SCV argued that the St. Paul 
campus was a less desirable location for the speech because very few 
students live on that campus, very few students living in the Minneapolis 
campus ever use the university’s bus service to visit that campus, and it 
would be an inconvenience for students living in the main Minneapolis 
campus to travel the three-and-a-half miles to the St. Paul campus for the 
 
 17.  Student Group Policies: Large Event Process, U. MINN. STUDENT UNIONS & 
ACTIVITIES, https://sua.umn.edu/get-involved/student-groups/student-group-policies#large-
ev ent-process (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
 18.  Young America’s Foundation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967 at 976 (Note: Despite the 
spelling, Willey is pronounced like Wiley, not like Willy.).  
 19.  Id. at 977. 
 20.  Id. at 976. 
 21.  Id. at 977. 
 22.  Id. Many buildings on the UMN campus, as well as in both the cities of Minneapolis 
and St. Paul, are connected to neighboring buildings via skyways so that individuals can move 
from building to building without having to set foot outside during winter. See Minneapolis 
Skyway Guide, Meet Minneapolis, https://www.minneapolis.org/map-transportation/minneap 
olis-skyway-guide/. 
 23.  Young America’s Foundation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967 at 977. 
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speech.24 Furthermore, SCV alleged that they had received more than 700 
requests for information about the speech, which would make the 1,056-seat 
auditorium in Willey Hall a more logical venue than the North Star 
Ballroom.25 However, in early February 2018, SCV withdrew its application 
for reserving Willey Hall and agreed to have Shapiro speak in St. Paul.26 
Shapiro spoke on February 26, 2018, to an audience of about 450.27 The 
university provided equipment for livestreaming the speech online.28 A 
crowd of a few dozen people protested Shapiro’s speech outside the St. Paul 
venue.29 In other words, Shapiro spoke with hardly a fuss. 
In July 2018, the Young America’s Foundation (YAF) and SCV filed a 
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against 
Dussault, Clark and Buhta, as well as UMN President Eric Kaler and Vice 
President Michael Berthelsen, claiming, inter alia, that the school’s LSEP 
was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Shapiro’s speech.30 YAF 
and SCV alleged that the university’s concerns for security were unfounded, 
and rather amounted to viewpoint discrimination and were used as a means 
to effectively “banish”31 Shapiro’s speech. 
On February 26, 2019, Judge Susan Richard Nelson issued an opinion 
granting the university’s motion to dismiss YAF’s and SCV’s claims of the 
LSEP being facially unconstitutional.32 However, Judge Nelson did not grant 
the university’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ challenge that the LSEP was 
unconstitutional as applied.33 In so ruling, Judge Nelson laid the groundwork 
for the potential legal battle over the as-applied challenge. First, she held that 
the venues in question on the UMN campus should be considered limited 
public forums.34 Such a categorization meant that the constitutionality of 
UMN’s LSEP would be upheld so long as the restrictions it put in place were 
viewpoint neutral and reasonable based on the purpose of the forum.35 
Second, Judge Nelson held that “in the absence of any specific information 
about planned protests in response to Mr. Shapiro, or other potentially 
 
 24.  Id. at 976-77. 
 25.  Id. at 977. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Motion to Dismiss at 21, Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, No. 0:18-cv-01864-
CV-1864 (SRN-HB), 2019 WL 936663 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2018). 
 29.  Id. at 10. 
 30.  Complaint at 13, Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, No. 0:18-cv-01864 
(SRN/HB), 2018 WL 3321944 (D. Minn. July 3, 2018) (Trial Pleading). 
 31.  Young America’s Foundation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 977. 
 32.  Id. at 974. 
 33.  Id. at 995 (Judge Nelson also dismissed the claims as they applied to President Kaler, 
but not as they applied to the other defendants.).  
 34.  Id. at 986. 
 35.  Id. 
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disruptive behavior, it is plausible that Defendants’ decision to move the 
speech to the St. Paul campus may have been based merely on concerns that 
some persons on the [] campus objected to [Mr. Shapiro’s] viewpoint,” rather 
than objective criteria regarding security concerns as defined by the LSEP.36 
Thus, the question of whether the application of the LSEP was both 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral would hinge on whether university 
officials reasonably expected extraordinary security concerns due to the 
speech, as well as whether the policies afforded the officials unbridled 
discretion to move the speech regardless of whether the concerns were 
reasonable. 
Each of these issues will be analyzed in turn, starting with the question 
of forum analysis. The goals of these analyses are to assess the 
constitutionality of UMN’s policy, and, assuming the policy is 
constitutional, to develop the concept of forum delegation and how it might 
be applied on a broader scale. 
 
B. Forum Analysis 
Courts have clearly articulated that an entire university campus cannot 
be categorized as one type of forum or another.37 Rather, public universities 
are made up of a variety of potential categories of forums,38 and therefore 
legal battles have centered on how the various parts of a public university 
should be categorized in the context of forum analysis. For example, is an 
open green space, a sidewalk or a street contained within a university campus 
a traditional public forum because it is analogous to a city park, sidewalk or 
street, which are generally considered traditional public forums? What about 
a large auditorium (like the one in Willey Hall in the UMN case), where 
universities and student groups invite speakers to give speeches? What about 
small classrooms? Answering these questions is important for shedding light 
on the UMN case, but also for defining the concept of forum delegation 
within the public university context. 
To better understand public forum doctrine as it applies to public 
universities, it is important to give a very brief overview of public forum 
doctrine as it applies certain types of government property in general. The 
doctrine has its roots in Justice Owen Roberts’ famous dicta in Hague v. 
CIO: 
 
 36.  Young America’s Foundation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 990 (internal quotes omitted). 
 37.  Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that “the fact that a 
University may make a discrete location on a sprawling campus available for public discourse 
does not compel the conclusion that it must open the doors of all of its facilities for public 
discourse.”). 
 38.  Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976-7 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A modern university 
contains a variety of fora. Its facilities may include private offices, classrooms, laboratories, 
academic medical centers, concert halls, large sports stadiums and arenas, and open spaces.”). 
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Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and 
liberties of citizens.39 
 
It was not until the 1960s brought a series of Civil Rights Era First 
Amendment cases before the Court that the idea behind Roberts’ dicta 
gained both doctrinal status and a name (public forum doctrine),40 with 
Professor Harry Kalven given credit for coining the term in his famous 1965 
law review article.41 The first time the term appeared in a Supreme Court 
opinion was in 1972, and that in a citation to Kalven’s article.42 The speed at 
which the doctrine appeared and began to develop has led several scholars 
to criticize the foundations and purposes of the doctrine.43 
Following the christening of the doctrine, the Court was tasked with 
defining its boundaries, namely surrounding the question of whether any 
government-owned property should be considered a public forum. In 
answering “no” to that question across cases involving government property 
in the form of prisons,44 military bases,45 an inter-office mail system for 
public employees,46 public utility poles,47 a charity function for a government 
 
 39.  Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 S. Ct. 954 (1939). 
 40.  Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 86 (1992). 
 41.  Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1 (1965). 
 42.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 n. 5 (1972); see BeVier, supra note 
40, at 87. 
 43.  Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of 
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987) (arguing, “Although public forum 
doctrine has developed with extraordinary speed, it has done so in a manner heedless of its 
constitutional foundations.”); BeVier, supra note 40, at 80 (arguing that “the cacophony of 
opinions” on public forum “reflect fundamentally different conceptions of the goals of the 
First Amendment.”); Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 661 (2010) (arguing that decades of conflicting conceptions of 
public forum doctrine has led the doctrine to have “little predictive power . . . in inapt 
settings.”). 
 44.  Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1969). 
 45.  Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
 46.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).  
 47.  Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 
(1984). 
(4) JOHNSON ARTICLE FINAL (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2019  2:18 PM 
2019 FORUM DELEGATION 85 
agency,48 the sidewalk in front of a public building,49 and—appropriately—
public university buildings,50 the Court was forced to consider the extent to 
which First Amendment activities could be protected in such venues. The 
result was a categorization system. Following Roberts’ dicta, the category of 
traditional public forums reflects public locations where First Amendment 
activities traditionally take place: public streets, sidewalks, parks and 
plazas.51 The constitutionality of government restriction of speech in these 
forums is determined using the highest level of review: strict scrutiny. Thus, 
to withstand constitutional scrutiny, restrictions on speech in these forums 
must be content-neutral, further a significant government interest, be 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, and allow ample alternative 
channels for expression to speakers affected by these restrictions.52 
Generally, restrictions are seen as constitutional if they address only the time, 
place or manner in which the speech is expressed. For instance, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that restrictions on the volume of music played 
within a public forum,53 or restrictions on the ability to erect tents for 
overnight sleeping on the National Mall,54 were valid content-neutral 
regulations of speech despite the fact that they impinged upon the central 
message of the speakers in each case. 
One small step below traditional public forums are designated public 
forums. These consist of government-controlled venues other than 
traditional public forums that the government has explicitly set aside (i.e., 
“designated”) for the same First Amendment activities that would occur in a 
traditional public forum, “even though it was not constitutionally required to 
do so.”55 Unlike with traditional public forums, government can also choose 
to close these forums from communicative activity.56 Venues that the 
government could designate as public forums include municipal theaters,57 
 
 48.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
 49.  United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
 50.  Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 51.  Kalven, supra note 41, at 11-12 (writing, “in an open democratic society the streets, 
the parks, and other public places are an important facility for public discussion and political 
process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and 
empathy with which such facilities are made available is an index of freedom.”). 
 52.  Caplan, supra note 43, at 650-1. 
 53.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 54.  Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 55.  BeVier, supra note 40, at 92. 
 56.  Id. See also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (“Traditional public 
forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and will 
not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property 
that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the 
government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the 
statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property.”). 
 57.  Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
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meeting rooms at public schools,58 or even a public official’s Twitter 
account.59 As with traditional public forums, strict scrutiny would be applied 
to assess the constitutionality of restrictions on speech in designated public 
forums, given the fact that they serve the same function.60 It is important to 
note that the government can only create a designated public forum (which, 
like traditional public forums, would trigger a strict scrutiny level of review) 
by explicit intent. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1985, “The government 
does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting 
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum 
for public discourse.”61 Therefore, public universities do not create a 
designated public forum simply by opening up certain spaces (whether green 
space or lecture halls) to a speaker. Rather, they must specifically state that 
the venue they have opened up is intended to be a designated public forum. 
However, there have been recent efforts by state legislatures to statutorily 
define certain public spaces on public university campuses as traditional 
public forums, thereby stripping from universities the discretion to designate 
these spaces as public or nonpublic forums.62 Such bills passed by 
statehouses have been in response to public universities creating so-called 
“free speech zones” on campus,63 whereby schools specifically designate 
certain (often out-of-the-way) areas on campus as public forums for use by 
members of the university community and members of the general public 
alike.64 
 
 58.  Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 553 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 59.  Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, 302 F.Supp.3d 541 (S.D. N.Y. 2018). 
 60.  Caplan, supra note 43, at 652. 
 61.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 62.  See, e.g., Emily Wangen, Campus Free-Speech Bill Passes Iowa Senate, DAILY 
IOWAN (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.dailyiowan.com/2019/03/11/campus-free-speech-bill-
passes-iowa-senate/; S. B. 93, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) at 2 (“The 
outdoor areas of campuses of public institutions of higher education in this state shall be 
deemed traditional public forums. Public institutions of higher education may maintain and 
enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in service of a significant institutional 
interest only when such restrictions employ clear, published, content, and viewpoint-neutral 
criteria, and provide for ample alternative means of expression. Any such restrictions shall 
allow for members of the university community to spontaneously and contemporaneously 
assemble.”). 
 63.  See, e.g., Mo. S. B. 93, supra note 62; Iowa Senate File 274, 88th Gen. Assemb. 
(Iowa (2019) § 4.2 (“Except as provided in this chapter, and subject to reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions, a public institution of higher education shall not designate any area 
of campus a free-speech zone or otherwise create policies restricting expressive activities to 
a particular outdoor area of campus.”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using 
Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 
31 J.C. & U. L. 481, 503-4 (2005); Neal H. Hutchins & Frank Fernandez, Searching for 
Balance with Student Free Speech: Campus Speech Zones, Institutional Authority, and 
Legislative Prerogatives, 5 BELMONT L. REV. 103 (2018). Note: although the topic of free 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum of forum categorization are 
nonpublic forums, which consist of government-owned property in which 
the government, “no less than a private owner of property, has power to 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”65 The level of constitutional review applied to these forums 
focuses on the reasonableness of government restrictions on speech, though 
restrictions are still required to be content neutral.66 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has also used the term “limited public forum” to refer to virtually the same 
phenomenon as nonpublic forums.67 Professor Caplan notes that the 
interchangeable nature of these two terms has let to confusion among both 
judges and scholars alike,68 and Professor Post has suggested abandoning the 
term “limited public forum” altogether and moving ahead solely with the 
term “nonpublic forum.”69 As with Judge Nelson’s ruling in the UMN case, 
many courts have held that public university venues at issue in First 
Amendment cases are “limited public forums,”70 though other courts have 
called similar venues “nonpublic forums.”71 Though not necessarily 
 
speech zones appears to relate to explicating the concept of forum delegation, it is distinct in 
that the creation of free speech zones is an a priori means by public universities to manage 
First Amendment activities on their campuses rather than a doctrinal principle that could be 
used to manage venue use by controversial speakers on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the 
concept of free speech zones will not be further discussed herein. 
 65.  Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1969). See also 1 Smolla & Nimmer on 
Freedom of Speech § 8:8 (2018) (defining nonpublic forums as consisting “of publicly owned 
facilities that have been dedicated to use for either communicative or noncommunicative 
purposes, but that never have been designated for indiscriminate expressive activity by the 
general public.”). 
 66.  Caplan, supra note 43, at 652 n.28. 
 67.  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Good 
News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-7 (2001).  
 68.  Caplan, supra note 43, at 654. 
 69.  Post, supra note 43, at 1754. See also Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 2140 (2009) (arguing that the terms “designated public forum” and 
“limited public forum” should be collapsed into a concept called a “middle forum” defined 
by an objective observer’s analysis of what the purposes of the forum are and whether the 
government is endorsing a particular message in allowing certain speakers to use the forum 
over others). 
 70.  Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (holding that student 
organizations at the University of California, Hastings College of Law were limited public 
forums); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819 (holding that a university’s student activity fee system 
was a limited public forum); Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that open 
parts of campus where a group sought to distribute newspapers were limited public forums); 
Bourgault v. Yudof, 316 F. Supp. 2d 411 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that a pedestrian area on 
a public university’s campus was a limited public forum). 
 71.  Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that public areas on a 
university’s campus were nonpublic forums because they were open to “expressive activity 
for a limited purpose by certain groups,” such as students); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 
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dispositive, universities also attempt to define their public spaces as either 
limited or nonpublic forums in their speech codes as a means to reinforce 
this precedent.72 Regardless of which of the two labels is used, the spaces at 
issue are treated with the same level of constitutional scrutiny noted above. 
Determining the difference between traditional public forums and 
nonpublic forums is not simply a matter of categorically labeling one type of 
property as one rather than the other. Rather, the function of the property—
and the role the government plays in facilitating that function—becomes the 
determining factor in categorization.73 For instance, using this logic, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that not all public streets and sidewalks may be 
considered traditional public forums, a holding that has helped shape lower 
court decisions regarding such property on public university campuses. 
Relying on the Court’s holding in United States v. Kokinda,74 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that “it is of lesser significance that 
the [university’s] sidewalks and Pedestrian Mall physically resemble 
municipal sidewalks and public parks. The physical characteristics of the 
property alone cannot dictate forum analysis.”75 In Kokinda, the Court held 
that the sidewalk in front of a U.S. Post Office was not a public forum, 
applying the principle that “the location and purpose of a publicly owned 
sidewalk is critical to determining whether such a sidewalk constitutes a 
public forum.”76 That analysis allowed the Eleventh Circuit to deem 
constitutional a university’s policy limiting the ability of a speaker not 
associated with the university to speak on the school’s sidewalks and in other 
open areas. 
 
2d 853 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that parts, but not all, of a public university could be 
considered nonpublic forums). 
 72.  See, e.g., Chapter 13. Speech, Expression, and Assembly, Univ. of Tex, http://catal 
og.utexas.edu/general-information/appendices/appendix-c/speech-expression-and-assembly/ 
(“The grounds and buildings owned or controlled by The University of Texas at Austin are 
not open for assembly, speech, or other activities as are the public streets, sidewalks, and 
parks. In furtherance of the University’s educational mission, the University campus is a 
limited forum open only to faculty, staff, and students. Unaffiliated groups and individuals 
may not engage in expressive activities at the University except in accordance with these 
rules.”); Chapter 1720-01-12: Use of University Property by Non-Affiliated Persons for Free 
Expression Activities, Rules of the Univ. of Tenn.: All Campuses, https://publications.tnso 
sfiles.com/rules/1720/1720-01/1720-01-12.20141015.pdf (“A student organization using a 
University limited public forum may invite a non-affiliated person to participate in the student 
organization’s free expression activities, subject to the terms of the invitation and subject to 
the time, place, and manner restrictions.”). 
 73.  See Caplan, supra note 43, 653. 
 74.  497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
 75.  Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1233 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 76.  Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 at 728-9. See also id. at 727 (holding that “[p]ublicly owned 
or operated property does not become a ‘public forum’ simply because members of the public 
are permitted to come and go at will”). 
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Professor Lillian BeVier has argued that the purpose of public forum 
doctrine has been to “reduce the systemic opportunities for public forum 
regulators to abuse their government power” to limit speech.77 She further 
contends that the essential question at issue in public forum cases is whether 
the doctrine “is sufficiently correlated with differing degrees of First 
Amendment risk.”78 Ultimately, in holding that public universities’ facilities 
are limited public forums or nonpublic forums, courts have only needed to 
apply a low level of scrutiny in cases involving restrictions on speakers’ 
ability to use these forums. As noted above, this level of scrutiny, which lies 
somewhere in between intermediate scrutiny and rational-basis review, 
merely requires that the universities prove that their restrictions on speech 
are reasonable in light of the use of the forum and not based on viewpoint 
discrimination.79 In applying this level of scrutiny, courts routinely have 
focused on universities’ educational mission and the security concerns posed 
by a controversial speaker in addressing the reasonableness of universities’ 
speech policies. Framed in terms of BeVier’s argument above, the debate 
surrounding the role a university’s central mission should play in 
determining the reasonableness of their speech regulations is essentially a 
debate about the risk these policies pose to the First Amendment. 
 
C. A University’s Mission 
Just as a public university has many types of public forums, a public 
university has many missions. As University of Virginia Professor Chad 
Wellmon wrote in an op-ed following the violence in his school’s home city 
of Charlottesville in August 2017, a university is “a health center, a federal 
contractor, a sports franchise, an event venue, and, almost incidentally, [an 
institution] devoted to education and knowledge.”80 Therefore, it is difficult 
to cleanly assess what role First Amendment activities play in a university’s 
mission. Are they integral to its mission of educating students? Of being a 
civic institution that serves multiple communities? Of being merely an event 
venue? Two scholars of higher education recently argued that “allowing 
access to campus spaces for speech and expressive activities is only one 
aspect of the multiple functions carried out at public colleges and 
universities.”81 But do these multiple functions (or missions) even justify 
allowing access at all, or perhaps justify reasonable restrictions on access? 
 
 77.  BeVier, supra note 43, at 81. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Supra Caplan, note 43. 
 80.  Chad Wellmon, For Moral Clarity, Don’t Look to Universities, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
ED. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/For-Moral-Clarity-Dont-
Look/240921. 
 81.  Hutchins & Fernandez, supra note 64, at 109. 
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Generally, courts have held that universities’ mission primarily 
involves the education of their students. For example, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a public university’s “mission 
necessarily focuses on the students and other members of the university 
community.”82 However, courts and scholars are divided over the extent to 
which (or even whether) this mission should be a determining factor in 
assessing the constitutionality of university restrictions on speech in their 
forums. In the very same case, the Fourth Circuit held that the purpose of a 
university “is clearly to provide a venue for its students to obtain an 
education, not to provide a venue for expression of public views that are not 
requested or sponsored by any member of the campus community.”83 
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit referred public universities a “special type 
of enclave” devoted to higher education,84 relying on language from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Grace, which referred to the 
grounds around the U.S. Supreme Court building as such an “enclave” apart 
from traditional public forums.85 It is somewhat ironic that the Fourth Circuit 
chose that particular word given the Supreme Court’s rather clear statement 
in Healy v. James that “state colleges and universities are not enclaves 
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.”86 One commentator has 
noted that the Fourth Circuit’s word choice “fl[ies] in the face of Healy,” and 
risks “so narrow[ing] the range of expression and the variety of speakers who 
can engage in First Amendment activities on campus as to sterilize university 
campuses [. . .].”87 
On the contrary, Professor Paul Horwitz questions whether public 
universities must necessarily be required to abide the same constitutional 
principles regarding the permissibility of their speech codes.88 Professor 
Horwitz suggests that courts “should not assume that all [public universities] 
place the search for truth at the heart of their mission, nor that the search for 
truth can only be served by the same free-for-all discourse that the First 
Amendment guarantees for public speech at large.”89 Rather, Horwitz 
suggests that universities should be allowed to freely experiment with the 
level of restrictiveness of their speech codes. Doing so, he argues, would 
force universities to confront the meaning of their educational mission and 
 
 82.  American Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. 
 85.  461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).  
 86.  408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). 
 87.  Stephen Douglas Bonney, The University Campus as Public Forum: The Legacy of 
Widmar v. Vincent, 81 UMKC L. REV. 545, 564-5 (2013). 
 88.  PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 127 (2013). 
 89.  Id. 
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how freedom of expression factors into that mission.90 This approach would 
create a true marketplace of ideas within the institution of higher education, 
allowing students and faculty members to choose to attend or work for a 
university that aligns with their values regarding freedom of expression or 
diversity and inclusion.91 The validity of Horwitz’s argument is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, it does allow for a more expansive 
understanding of what a public university’s mission is, which highlights how 
powerful this factor can be in deciding First Amendment cases in favor of 
universities. 
At least one federal judge has argued that such a fuss over a university’s 
central mission is misplaced and “irrelevant to a proper First Amendment 
forum analysis.”92 Rather, in his concurring opinion in Bowman v. White, 
Judge Kermit Bye contended that the streets, sidewalks and parks controlled 
by the university should be considered traditional public forums given their 
substantial similarity to forums controlled by cities or towns.93 Moreover, 
Judge Bye argued that even assuming that the university’s mission could be 
factored into the categorization of the forum, he contended that expressive 
conduct, whether by students or outside groups (though perhaps especially 
involving the latter) is in fact compatible with—if not central to—a mission 
of promoting higher education, and that the majority failed to give this 
particular mission due weight in its forum analysis.94 
The issue of whether a public university’s educational mission is 
dispositive when determining the constitutionality of its restrictions on 
speech is central to the question of the extent to which (or even whether) 
speakers not affiliated with the university (“outside speakers”) have a right 
to speak on university campuses. Undergirding the doctrine related to this 
issue is dictum in a footnote from the 1981 case Widmar v. Vincent, in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court noted that a public university need not “make all of 
its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike,” nor must it 
“grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.”95 Relying on Widmar, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia Tech 
could require an itinerant preacher to use an outdoor location on campus that 
saw less student foot traffic rather than a central outdoor location on campus 
due to the fact that his presence on campus was not sponsored by a student 
organization.96 Similarly, in Bloedorn, the Eleventh Circuit held that a public 
university’s educational mission was a reasonable justification for limiting 
 
 90.  Id. at 128. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 985 (8th Cir. 2006) (Bye, J., concurring). 
 93.  Id. at 984. 
 94.  Id. at 985. 
 95.  454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981). 
 96.  Gilles v. Torgersen, 71 F.3d 497, 500 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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the ability of outside speakers to speak on its campus.97 Some universities 
have incorporated language into their speech policies that mirror precedent 
from these cases.98 
Some have argued that this deference to a university’s mission goes too 
far. In his concurring opinion in the Bowman case, Judge Bye took particular 
issue with the notion that a university’s mission should be narrowly framed 
as only applying to students: 
 
[T]here is no reason students who may or may not pay tuition and 
who may or may not live on campus should have more expressive 
rights upon a campus street than should non-students who directly 
support the public university with tax dollars. The non-student 
public attends civic, sporting, theater, and other events on public 
university campuses. In this sense, a public university belongs just 
as much to a community as it does to the students. Nor is a public 
university’s educational mission limited to its students—a 
university and its faculty publish books to benefit the public good 
and use public tax dollars to conduct important research.99 
 
Many scholars, commentators and public officials, if not other judges, 
certainly share Judge Bye’s outlook.100 Some universities have adopted 
 
 97.  Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1230 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 98.  See, e.g., Campus Free Speech, Univ. of Alaska, available at https://www 
alaska.edu/freespeech (“Universities openly test our assumptions and are home to 
controversial ideas, and we need to maintain this—but we also have to ensure the safety of 
our campuses and students.”) 
 99.  Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 988 (8th Cir. 2006). See also Nathan W. Kellum, 
If It Looks Like a Duck . . . . Traditional Public Forum Status of Open Areas on Public 
University Campuses, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 40 (2005) (writing, “The primary purpose 
of a university or college is generally compatible with expressive speech activity. On its face, 
universities serve to educate those students who attend, and such higher education best 
flourishes in an environment of various ideas. There can be little doubt that many ideas and 
theories have once been relegated to minority or disfavored status, but through free and open 
debate on college campuses, gained greater acceptance.”). 
 100.  See, e.g., Editorial, Discourse and Distress: Sessions Frankly Addresses Campus 
Free Speech, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 28, 2017) (commenting on Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions’ speech about threats to free speech on college campuses and contending that 
“campuses shouldn’t promote senseless obstacles out of fear of robust discussion”); Editorial, 
Hurt Feelings? Too Bad. Don’t Coddle College Kids, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2015), at A7 
(commenting on University of Chicago’s First-Amendment-friendly speech policy and 
arguing that “this war on free speech does students a disservice by shielding them from the 
real world, where they won’t be able to silence co-workers and bosses whose speech they 
dislike”); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Free Expression on Campus: Mitigating the Costs of 
Contentious Speakers, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 166-167 (2018) (arguing that “higher 
education institutions are the quintessential sit for contestation of ideas,” and that “[a]lthough 
college and university campuses are hardly the only forums where vigorous debate can take 
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speech policies that embrace First Amendment activities as part of their core 
mission.101 A former legal director of the ACLU Foundation of Kansas and 
Western Missouri called the distinction between outsiders and students as 
potential speakers at public universities “a crabbed view of . . . free speech 
rights,” noting that outside speakers “are not hostile alien invaders but are an 
integral part of the university’s milieu and surrounding environs.”102 
Furthermore, contrary to cases cited here involving outside speakers, in the 
UMN case a student group did sponsor the controversial speaker in question, 
and thus precedent from these cases does not appear to apply to the UMN 
case. However, the discussion surrounding the power of deference to the 
university’s mission is important to two other issues in this case: the issue of 
ensuring security for the campus community, and the issue of unbridled 
discretion. 
 
D. Security Concerns 
Professor Kenneth Lasson called security “[p]erhaps the most important 
practical concern of universities faced with the question of whether to 
provide a forum for a controversial speaker.”103 It is important to consider 
the role security plays not only in whether a university can prevent a speaker 
from speaking, but also in terms of how it can manage a speaker who is 
planning to speak on campus. In grappling with the latter issue, UMN 
essentially has two distinct, yet related, concerns about security for the 
Shapiro speech: first, the likelihood that the speech will lead to violent 
actions; and second, the amount of resources needed to provide adequate 
security for the speech, particularly as it relates to the first concern. Each 
concern will be analyzed in turn before being considered in tandem. 
 
1. Likelihood of Violence 
Following violent reactions to controversial speakers over the past 
several years, it is understandable that universities would want to prevent 
similar violence from erupting on their campuses. It is relevant to note that 
 
place, they remain among the few locations in American society today where those debates 
occur in person.”). 
 101.  See, e.g., Guiding Principles, Univ. of Ill. System (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.uillinois.edu/about /guiding_principles (“An unyielding allegiance to freedom of 
speech—even controversial, contentious, and unpopular speech—is indispensable to 
developing the analytical and communication skills of our students and empowering all 
members of our university communities to be active and informed citizens. We are committed 
to the open exchange of competing ideas, perspectives, and values—a founding principle that 
built our nation—and to making the U of I System’s own distinctive institutional voice part 
of these productive dialogues.”). 
 102.  Bonney, supra note 87, at 562. 
 103.  Kenneth Lasson, Controversial Speakers on Campus: Liberties, Limitations, and 
Common-Sense Guidelines, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 39, 88 (1999) (emphasis added). 
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UMN Police Chief Matthew Clark noted security issues with “past lectures 
at other universities” in his email to SCV as sufficient evidence to justify 
moving Shapiro’s speech to St. Paul.104 This rationale is not new. Auburn 
University cited the violence in Charlottesville when it initially tried to 
prevent Richard Spencer from speaking on campus, though Chief Judge W. 
Keith Watkins of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama 
held that the university could “not cut off the free speech of Mr. Spencer or 
other persons except as a last resort to ensure security or to prevent violence 
or property damage, and only after first making bona fide efforts to protect 
the speaker from . . . hostility by other, less restrictive means.”105 Michigan 
State University tried to rely on this strategy as well before relenting and 
allowing Spencer to speak in a far-flung venue on its campus.106 However, 
UMN’s use of this rationale is unique because of the action it spurred: 
moving the speech rather than banning it. Before discussing the 
constitutionality of this move and its underlying rationale, it is important to 
discuss the more serious infraction of denying someone the right to speak 
out of fear that the speech would incite violence. 
The incitement standard in First Amendment jurisprudence comes from 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.107 In 
reversing a Ku Klux Klan leader’s conviction under Ohio’s criminal 
syndicalism law, the Court held that “the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy 
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”108 Professor Clay Calvert has convincingly argued that 
the prophylactic use of the Brandenburg test to prevent incitement to 
violence would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.109 Professor Calvert 
notes that the Brandenburg test can only be triggered “when an individual 
actually starts to speak,” because “[w]ithout words, there simply is no 
advocacy to proscribe. There is simply a person and a guess about what he 
might say.”110 
 
 104.  Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967, 977 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 
2019). 
 105.  Padgett v. Auburn University, No. 3:17-CV-231-WKW, 2017 WL 10241386, at 2 
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2017) (internal quotes omitted). 
 106.  Brown, supra note 7. 
 107.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 108.  Id. at 447. 
 109.  Clay Calvert, Reconsidering Incitement, Tinker and the Heckler’s Veto on College 
Campuses: Richard Spencer and the Charlottesville Factor, 112 NW. L. REV. 109 (2018). 
 110.  Id. at 120. See also Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F.2d 595, 600 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding 
that an administrator’s attempt to ban speakers from campus because their “views would be 
apt to exacerbate the tensions between the College and the community; and . . . would be apt 
to provoke discussions between students and encourage them to action . . . cannot justify an 
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Furthermore, the violent reaction that university officials are 
presumably more concerned about stems from individuals who are hostile 
rather than sympathetic to the speaker’s message. In other words, it is 
unlikely that a speech by Shapiro on the oppression of white males would 
inspire white male audience members to commit acts of violence against 
students of color immediately following Shapiro’s speech, let alone that 
Shapiro himself would command audience members to commit such 
violence in a way that would run afoul of the Brandenburg test. Rather, a 
more likely scenario would involve individuals who vehemently believe that 
Shapiro’s message is evil protesting en masse near the speech’s venue, and 
tensions could escalate if this group and individuals sympathetic to Shapiro’s 
message came in close proximity to each other. If violence did erupt, it would 
be inconsequential who threw the first punch. Rather, the sheer presence of 
a restive mob at the venue is key kindling that could be stoked into violence. 
The question becomes: does this potential for violence that is sparked by 
Shapiro’s ability to attract a hostile audience justify moving him to a 
different part of campus? Answering this question requires an examination 
of the heckler’s veto principle and its relation to a university’s concerns that 
it would have sufficient resources to handle potential security issues. 
When state officials silence a speaker to appease a hostile audience, it 
is an unconstitutional “heckler’s veto.”111 In 1949, the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down the disorderly conduct conviction of a racist priest after his 
speech caused hostile audience members to throw bricks and bottles at 
 
infringement of First Amendment rights.”). But cf Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 970 
(N.D. Miss. 1969) (holding that “in order to withstand constitutional attack, prior restraints 
must be narrowly drafted so as to suppress only that speech which presents a ‘clear and present 
danger’ of resulting in serious substantive evil which a university has the right to prevent.”). 
The fact that this case was decided the same year as Brandenburg suggests that the 
Brandenburg test would supersede the “clear and present danger” test, though according to 
this court’s logic it is not completely clear that a prior restraint of speech would be a 
necessarily unconstitutional measure available to universities. It is worthwhile to note that 
Calvert argues that the “substantial disruption” test from the case Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 
U.S. 503 (1969), would be a more constitutionally sound approach to disinviting speakers 
compared to the Brandenburg test, though he counsels against the application of this test from 
the secondary school context to the milieu of public universities as it could “open[] the door 
for public universities . . . to censor the expression of their own students.” This paper will not 
venture into the discussion of whether the substantial disruption test could or should be 
applied at public universities as it essentially focuses on whether speakers can be allowed on 
campus rather than the more nuanced discussion of how public universities can manage the 
controversial speakers who do come to campus. 
 111.  See, e.g., Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and 
Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions against Controversial Speech, 21 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 175 (2016) (discussing heckler’s veto jurisprudence generally); Cheryl A. 
Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1305, 1306 (2007) (defining a heckler’s veto as a situation when “the state [hides] behind 
the unpleasant reaction of some portions of the public in order to silence a speaker”). 
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him.112 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas outlined the reasoning behind 
denying power to heckler’s vetoes: 
 
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to 
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is 
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and 
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses 
for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though 
not absolute, . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or 
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a . . . serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or unrest.113 
 
However, the issue of whether speakers deliberately provoke an 
audience to become violent has divided judges. In 2015, a divided U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that law enforcement 
officials infringed upon the First Amendment right of a group of Christian 
preachers speaking at a local Arab-American festival when they arrested the 
preachers for causing Muslims festivalgoers to react violently to their anti-
Islamic messages.114 Writing for the majority in the 8-7 en banc decision, 
Judge Eric Clay held, “If the speaker, at his or her own risk, chooses to 
continue exercising the constitutional right to freedom of speech [before a 
hostile audience], he or she may do so without fear of retribution by the state, 
for the speaker is not the one threatening to breach the peace of break the 
law.”115 In dissent, Judge John Rogers argued that by protecting 
controversial speakers, police offers are incentivizing them to make their 
messages more hostile, writing, “Faced with the choice of allowing you to 
be an injured martyr . . . or serving as a protective guard as the disruption 
escalates, the officers will doubtless choose the latter and become your 
phalanx.”116 Therefore, an argument could be made that allowing state 
officials the power to reduce the opportunity for a speaker to goad a hostile 
audience into a violent reaction—say, by moving the venue of a controversial 
speech—could split this philosophical difference in heckler’s veto situations. 
So, does a heckler’s veto principle apply to the UMN case? Lower-court 
decisions discussed above would suggest the answer is no, due mainly to 
 
 112.  Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 113.  Id. at 4. 
 114.  Bible Believers v. Wayne Co., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 115.  Id. at 253. 
 116.  Id. at 274 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
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three factors. First, the venue is a limited/nonpublic forum, meaning the 
constitutionality of the university’s policies for ensuring safety could be 
upheld on simple reasonableness grounds. Second, the university did not try 
to ban Shapiro’s speech or stop him from speaking to quell a hostile 
audience, which would follow more classic examples of heckler’s vetoes. 
Finally, the university’s action could be considered reasonable in light of the 
fact that it had limited resources to devote to security in the event violent 
protests erupted on the more densely populated Minneapolis campus. This 
issue of sufficient security resources is an important one that deserves further 
examination. 
 
2. Sufficient Resources 
Recent events involving controversial speakers have led public 
universities to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on security costs.117 
As University of Florida President Kent Fuchs put it in an op-ed following 
alt-right leader Richard Spencer’s speech at UF in October 2017, the more 
than $600,000 the university spent in security costs for the event was the “the 
equivalent of nearly 100 students’ annual tuition.”118 Public universities, or 
any state actor, is constitutionally forbidden from billing these speakers for 
these exorbitant security costs. More specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in 1992 that state actors could not assess varying fees to different groups 
seeking to speak in a public forum based on the level of security that the 
government believed the speakers would need.119 As Justice Blackmun put 
it in his opinion for the Court, “Speech cannot be financially burdened, any 
more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a 
hostile mob.”120 However, charging a speaker more for his or her 
controversial speech and making judgments on how to manage that speech 
given the extent of a university’s resources are likely two distinct concepts. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that universities have the right “to make 
academic judgments as to how best to allocate scare resources.”121 Thus, as 
universities inevitably must balance these competing concerns, courts have 
had to take that balancing act into account when deciding case involving 
university restrictions on speech. 
In Bloedorn, the Eleventh Circuit held that the university’s significant 
interest in ensuring safety and order on campus permitted its strict regulation 
 
 117.  See, e.g., Erica Goldberg, Must Universities “Subsidize” Controversial Ideas? 
Allocating Security Fees When Student Groups Host Divisive Speakers, 21 GEO. MASON U. 
CIV. RTS. L.J. 349 (2011). 
 118.  Kent Fuchs and Glenn C. Altschuler, How White Supremacists Exploit Public 
Higher Education, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2017), at A17. 
 119.  Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992). 
 120.  Id. at 135. 
 121.  Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981). 
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of the times and places in which outside speakers could speak, especially 
given the fact that the school employed a “limited security force.”122 
Similarly, in Bowman, the Eighth Circuit held that the university had a 
significant interest in its strict regulation of permits to outside speakers 
“because of the time and resources necessary to accommodate the crowds” 
attracted by a controversial speaker, thereby disrupting “the unique 
educational environment” of the university.123 The court further noted that 
“a university is less able than a city or other entity with police powers to deal 
with a significant disruption on short notice,” which justified the university’s 
requirement of outside speakers giving officials at least three days of notice 
of their intention to speak on campus.124 Even Judge Bye, who believed that 
the university’s sidewalks in Bowman should have been categorized as 
traditional public forums, ended up concurring with the court’s decision 
because he believed the university’s interest in security and crowd control 
while faced with limited resources was sufficiently significant to justify its 
policy of permitting and requiring advance notice.125 The Fourth Circuit in 
Mote also held that a university that opened its entire campus to all members 
of the public would have to utilize a greater amount of its limited resources 
to supervise outside speakers.126 In a case from 20 years earlier, the Fourth 
Circuit held that a university’s “limited resources are not well spent on 
politicking a regulation for the benefit of third parties [the distribution of 
newspapers] rather than on enhancing the principal objective, i.e., 
education.”127 
Exactly how much a university can expect to spend on security for 
controversial speakers is difficult to calculate. On the one hand Professor 
Erica Goldberg suggests that such factors as the number of audience 
members attending a talk, the number of entrances and exits to a particular 
venue, and whether the event is open to the public or only to students could 
be relatively easily measures for calculating security costs.128 On the other 
hand, Professor Kenneth Lasson has suggested that more nebulous and 
“multifarious exigencies occasioned by controversial speakers,” including 
“the tenor of the times, nature of the forum, current tensions on campus, and 
the size and makeup of the student body,” could factor into a university’s 
calculus over what resources it would need to summon for security.129 The 
 
 122.  Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1238 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 123.  Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 981 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 124.  Id. at 982. 
 125.  Id. at 991 (Bye, J., concurring). 
 126.  American Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 445 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 127.  Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197, 1203 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 128.  Goldberg, supra note 117, at 399. 
 129.  Lasson, supra note 103, at 59. 
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UMN plan in the Shapiro case appears to have considered both of these 
categories of factors. 
If a university is not allowed to pass the security costs associated with 
hosting a controversial onto the speaker or the student group that invited him 
or her, and if the university cannot ban the speaker from speaking out of a 
concern for a violent reaction, then moving the venue for the speaker’s 
speech seems to be the most appropriate means of balancing the university’s 
goals of public safety, its education mission, reducing security costs, and 
upholding First Amendment principles. However, one more key issue 
(indeed, arguably the main triable issue in the UMN case) remains: the 
university’s policy on delegating forums to controversial speakers out of a 
concern for security and resource management must still be content neutral, 
lack vagueness, and not place unbridled discretion in the hands of 
administrators. 
 
E. Content Neutrality, Vagueness and Unbridled Discretion 
Deference to a university’s mission may lend a presumption of 
constitutionality to its restrictions on access to its forums. However, the 
school’s regulations must still be content neutral. Several cases discussed 
above show a pretty clear-cut example of content neutral restrictions, such 
as policies involving bans on outside speakers, regardless of what those 
speakers wanted to say.130 A pretty strong case can be made that UMN’s 
decision to move Shapiro was content neutral on its face: the university’s 
LSEP addressed security concerns regardless of the speaker’s message. 
Although a controversial speaker like Shapiro might garner more security 
attention, it is conceivable that UMN could have made a similar decision 
regarding an equally controversial leftwing speaker with the potential to lead 
to protests by conservative students and community members. However, a 
more nuanced issue regarding content neutrality lurks in this case in 
particular and behind the notion of forum delegation more broadly: schools’ 
policies can be held as discriminating on the basis of content if they deemed 
too vague or if they grant unbridled discretion to officials over how the 
policies should be wielded. These issues are central to YAF’s and SCV’s 
claims in the UMN case. 
 
1. Vagueness of Policy 
Professor BeVier identifies the vagueness doctrine in the context of 
public forum cases as essentially being focused on the “effect [of potentially 
vague policies] on official decision making about speech uses of public 
 
 130.  See, e.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006); Mote, 423 F.3d 438; 
Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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property.”131 For a university to avoid running afoul of the vagueness 
doctrine, its policies must specifically identify the security risks that the 
university seeks to either prevent or manage and how it considers speech to 
bring about those risks. For instance, the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California held that by vaguely defining impermissible expressive 
activities as those that could pose an “unreasonable risk of harm,” the 
policies of a consortium of community colleges gave campus presidents 
virtually unlimited discretion to identify and ban such speech.132 
It is also imperative that universities’ policies be written down, as 
opposed to existing as vague guidelines that administrators follow and 
speakers and student groups merely guess at. In Young America’s 
Foundation v. Napolitano, Judge Maxine Chesney of the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California signaled that unwritten policies 
involving regulating the speech of high-profile speakers could be subject to 
facial First Amendment challenges, while formal written policies would be 
more subject to as-applied challenges.133 This case involved a similar though 
importantly distinct set of facts to the UMN case. At issue were two policies 
used by the University of California-Berkeley to regulate speeches by 
controversial conservative speakers including Ann Coulter, David Horowitz 
and Ben Shapiro: an unwritten one (the High-Profile Speaker Policy, or 
HPSP) and a formal written one (the Major Events Policy, or MEP).134 The 
former was implemented in response to violent protests surrounding a 
planned speech by former Breitbart News editor Milo Yiannopoulos in 
February 2017.135 Essentially, the policy was a stop-gap measure that the 
university could rely on to regulate impending speeches by Coulter and 
Horowitz before a more formal policy could be created. The HPSP required 
“all events involving high-profile speakers to conclude by 3:00 p.m. and be 
held in securable locations, and . . . enabled University officials to impose 
security fee[s] . . . as a matter of discretion.”136 The university did not 
provide any criteria regarding which speakers might be considered “high-
profile” or what a “securable” venue meant.137 The university passed its most 
up-to-date version of the MEP in August 2017 and used it to set parameters 
 
 131.  BeVier, supra note 40, at 85. 
 132.  Khademi v. South Orange County Communication College District, 194 F. Supp. 2d 
1011, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2002). See also Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Houston, 259 F. Supp. 2d 
575, 584 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (striking down a university’s speech policy because it was facially 
“devoid of any objective guidelines or articulated standards that [administrators] . . . should 
consider when determining whether any given student expressive activity should be deemed 
‘potentially disruptive.’”). 
 133.  2018 WL 1947788 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 25, 2018). 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 3 (internal quotes omitted). 
 137.  Id. 
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on a speech by Shapiro.138 The new policy (which is analogous to the LSEP 
policy in the UMN case) essentially defined and codified the key concepts 
involved the HPSP, while also scrapping policies that the university had not 
followed consistently, such as the 3:00 p.m. cutoff time for large events.139 
Judge Chesney dismissed YAF’s claim that the MEP was vague and 
unconstitutional on its face.140 However, Judge Chesney denied the 
university’s motion to dismiss YAF’s as-applied challenges to both policies, 
particularly given evidence that the university used the MEP to justify 
charging YAF more than three times the security costs for the Coulter speech 
compared to what it charged a student group who invited Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor to speak.141 Furthermore, Judge Chesney denied the university’s 
motion to dismiss YAF’s Equal Protection claim given the same discrepancy 
in fees charged to student groups in the case of these two speakers.142 This 
case can be distinguished in part from the UMN case as it relates to the issue 
of this discrepancy in fees, which almost certainly appears unconstitutional 
in light of Forsyth. However, this case and the UMN case share a root issue: 
whether the policy in question was so vague that it opened the door for 
unequal treatment of speakers. This question, along with the issue of whether 
the policy also placed unbridled discretion in the hands of administrators, are 
arguably the central issues in both of these cases, and represent key hurdles 
for developing the concept of forum delegation. 
 
2. Unbridled Discretion 
The U.S. Supreme Court articulated the standard for avoiding unbridled 
discretion in the 2002 case Thomas v. Chicago Parks District.143 That case 
involved a Chicago ordinance requiring groups to apply for permits to use 
the city’s parks for events involving more than 50 people, which was used to 
deny a group seeking to demonstrate for the legalization of marijuana access 
to certain parks at certain times. The Court unanimously upheld the 
constitutionality of the ordinance, noting that its criteria for denial were 
“reasonably specific and objective, and d[id] not leave the [ultimate] 
decision [on use of the parks] to the whim of the administrator,” as well as 
the fact that the ordinance offered applicants two paths for appealing permit 
denials.144 
In cases involving issues of unbridled discretion regarding university 
speech policies, courts have appeared to side with universities when 
 
 138.  Napolitano, 2018 WL 1947788 at 1. 
 139.  Id. at 6. 
 140.  Id. at 10. 
 141.  Id. at 8. 
 142.  Id. at 9. 
 143.  534 U.S. 316 (2002). 
 144.  Id. at 324 (internal quotes omitted). 
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reasonable attempts are made to follow policies in a consistent manner.145 In 
contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas struck 
down the University of Houston’s speech policy because it contained no 
procedural safeguards to prevent giving administrators overly broad 
discretion to determine whether speech could be potentially disruptive.146 
Therefore, some universities have attempted to have reviews of applications 
to invite controversial speakers to go through multiple channels. For 
example, the University of Iowa requires such applications to be 
communicated to the chairperson of the Faculty Senate which, in turn, must 
be reviewed by the Committee on University Safety and Security, and 
ultimately reported to the Faculty Council.147 Multiple options are available 
to the chairperson, if deemed necessary, inclusive of a request for “the 
sponsoring college or department to change the location of the program or to 
restrict attendance to professional specialists only.”148 
 
F. Ample Alternative Channels 
Finally, the last part of constitutional review regarding public forums—
whether the state allows speakers ample alternative channels following 
regulation of their speech—is important to outlining the parameters of forum 
delegation given that the very issue in the UMN case involved moving a 
speaker from one venue to another. The key question is the definition of 
“ample.” The former general counsel for the Maine Community College 
System has argued that an alternative forum “need not be the best or as good 
as the [originally] selected forum; it need only accord a meaningful 
opportunity for expression.”149 Indeed, he continues, “[t]he availability of an 
alternative location for the speech enhances an institution’s argument that its 
denial in a different area is not a meaningful deprivation of the speaker’s true 
ability to be heard.”150 
An ample alternative channel may not necessarily be on the campus of 
the university responsible for restricting speech. In Bloedorn, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that Georgia State University allowed outside speakers amply 
alternative channels to speak by virtue of the fact that it was located within 
a municipality. The court held, “Surrounding the campus on every side are 
public streets and sidewalks from which Bloedorn can preach his message to 
 
 145.  Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1237 (11th Cir. 2011); American Civil Liberties 
Union v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 446 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 146.  Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Houston, 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 584 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
 147.  Chapter 28—Campus Speakers and Programs, Univ. of Iowa Operations Manual, 
https://opsmanual.uiowa.edu/administrative-financial-and-facilities-policies/campus-speaker 
s-and-programs. 
 148.  Id. at 28.2c(3). 
 149.  Langhauser, supra note 63, at 500. 
 150.  Id. 
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GSU community members as they enter and exit the campus.”151 Certainly, 
universities tend to have more unique speech-friendly forums than cities, like 
classrooms and lecture halls.152 Therefore, following the logic of Bloedorn, 
it is an open question whether the qualitative difference between one of these 
venues and a city’s streets or parks is sufficient to defeat the ample 
alternative channels requirement if a university were to wholly deny a 
speaker the chance to speak in one of its auditoriums. However, extending 
that logic to the UMN case, moving a speaker from one auditorium to another 
appears to satisfy the ample alternative channels requirement more so than 
the Bloedorn logic of moving a speaker from university sidewalks to city 
sidewalks, so long as the venue is of similar size and quality to another venue 
that speakers would prefer for some other reason (such as central location, 
as in the UMN case). 
 
G. Assessment of UMN Case and Potential Future Similar Cases 
The foregoing discussion opens the door to speculation about a 
potential decision on the merits of the UMN case should it go to trial. The 
array of precedents from various levels of federal courts suggests that 
UMN’s decision to move the event was reasonable in light of the university’s 
mission to simultaneously give students the opportunity to hear speakers 
with challenging viewpoints, ensure security of the university community, 
and efficiently manage its resources. The North Star Ballroom appears to be 
an ample alternative channel for the event, given that its capacity was within 
the attendance range that SCV had suggested in its application.153 Therefore, 
most likely, the case will hinge on the issues of whether UMN officials 
engaged in content discrimination when applying the LSEP to the Shapiro 
speech, and whether the policy gave the officials unbridled discretion to 
make their decision to move the event. Given the fact that officials discussed 
the change of venue with SCV, it is likely that UMN would prevail on the 
unbridled discretion issue. Thus, we are left with the issue of content 
discrimination. If the UMN cannot show that it implemented its policy in a 
fashion that it would have applied to other speakers (regardless of viewpoint) 
whose presence could have led to violence on campus, then the policy will 
fail. 
 
 151.  Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1241 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 152.  See Goldberg, supra 99. 
 153.  Young America’s Foundation v. Kaler, 370 F. Supp. 3d 967, 977 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 
2019). 
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To guide universities, student groups and outside speakers in future cases 
involving forum delegation, Error! Reference source not found. below 
offers a flowchart made up of key questions that could determine whether a 
student group should be granted its first choice of venue for an invited 
speaker, or whether the university’s choice should hold sway. The flowchart 
is framed in terms of two possible outcomes: a student group inviting a 
controversial speaker to campus can use its first choice of venue; and the 
university can allow the speech to go ahead in its choice of venue. 
Figure 1: Decision Flowchart for Forum Delegation at Public Universities 
 
The process begins with the university reviewing the application of a 
student group to invite the speaker. If the university has multiple venues of 
comparable size (and, certainly, not all public universities have this luxury), 
school officials can begin moving through a checklist of criteria to help them 
arrive at a final decision regarding which forum to delegate to the speech. 
These criteria are designed to reflect precedent from cases discussed above, 
and to provide university officials with clear and transparent guidelines for 
forum delegation, with safeguards in place to protect the interests of student 
groups and invited speakers. These criteria include: the level (and cost) of 
security required by the speaker; whether change of venue would actually 
alleviate those security concerns; and whether the change of venue would 
hinder the speaker’s ability to deliver the message. 
University officials would have to keep documentation of their 
decision-making process at each step of the flowchart so that speakers and 
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student groups could challenge university officials during an appeals 
process. For example, university officials should be prepared to file 
affidavits documenting their assessment of security risks and necessities 
involved with hosting a speaker. Such documentation should show that 
university officials’ assessments were not arbitrary and not based on 
viewpoint discrimination toward the speaker. The onus would also be on the 
school officials to show that moving the speaker would not hinder the 
speaker’s ability to deliver his or her message. For example, officials should 
be prepared to file affidavits documenting that the proposed alternative 
venue would not be unreasonably far away and unreasonably inaccessible 
via public transportation to allow students, or other members of the public, 
to adequately attend the event. When possible, consultation with neutral third 
parties could be advantageous for university officials to make their case for 
moving venues. 
Once these criteria have been satisfied, the flowchart would demand 
that student groups receive due process through the ability to appeal the 
school officials’ decisions. This provision would eliminate the risk that 
universities would be operating with unbridled discretion when following 
these policies. Exactly what type of appellate body would hear the student 
groups’ appeals is open for discussion. Ideally, a dispute resolution channel 
outside of the federal court system would be most cost-effective for both 
parties. A dispute resolution office housed within the university that could 
nevertheless act independently of university policy, such as an office of the 
ombudsperson, could satisfy this role. If the students’ appeal is upheld, then 
they could win the right to use their first choice for a venue. If the appeal is 
denied, the university’s choice of venue would be used for the speech. At no 
point in this process would university officials be allowed to deny the 
speaker a forum; their only power would be to choose which of several 
roughly equivalent forums to allow the speaker. 
 
II. Transposing Forum Delegation 
This paper has made two claims. First, the University of Minnesota’s 
handling of the Richard Shapiro speech was arguably constitutionally sound 
in light of precedent from current case law surrounding controversial 
speakers on public university campuses.154 Second, UMN’s handling of the 
speech offers a novel approach for dealing with controversial speakers on 
public university campuses: forum delegation. This method, if conducted 
properly, could balance the interests of speakers, audience members, 
community members, and the university in a way that does not unreasonably 
burden any party. This paper now puts forth the following proposition: forum 
delegation likely could be transposed beyond the public university setting to 
 
 154.  See supra Part. I.G. 
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government entities that manage multiple traditional public forums. This 
final section will elaborate on this transposition. In particular, this section 
will rely on Professor Robert Post’s notion of constitutional domains as 
applied to public forum doctrine as the theoretical vehicle for this 
transposition. It will then use counterfactual analysis with the litigation 
surrounding the issuing of a permit for the 2017 Unite the Right rally in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, to assess the validity of the transposition of forum 
delegation. 
 
A. Governance versus Management 
In his 1995 book Constitutional Domains, First Amendment scholar 
Robert Post conceives of three forms of social order (“domains”) through 
which to analyze the relationship between individuals and communication: 
community, management and public.155 The main goal of a community is to 
maintain the integrity of its social fabric, and thus communication functions 
to honor the identity and dignity of individuals within that community.156 
The main goal of the domain of management is to logically arrange 
individuals for the sake of achieving organizational ends, with 
communication functioning to further this goal.157 Lastly, the ultimate goal 
of the public is to subject the political and social order to public opinion, and 
communication facilitates this goal by allowing citizens to engage in self-
governance.158 Post poses these three domains as a means for developing 
constitutional theory and doctrine with clean boundary lines. These domains 
have the power to explain the exceptionally expansive nature of First 
Amendment protections,159 and justify restrictions on First Amendment 
activities—such as with public forum doctrine. 
In an earlier law review article, Professor Post applied the domains of 
management and the public to the communication goals at stake in public 
forum analysis.160 Post’s chief criticism with the development of public 
forum doctrine is that it has sought to categorize the forum status of 
government property based on the nature and purpose of that property.161 
 
 155.  Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains 2 (1995). 
 156.  Id. at 3-4. 
 157.  Id. at 4-6. 
 158.  Id. at 6-10. 
 159.  See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 601 (1990) (arguing generally that the goal of the First Amendment is to ensure that 
the domain of the public supersedes the domain of the community when it comes to freedom 
of expression, lest the subjective norms of the latter threaten the ability of the public to 
critically engage with challenging ideas of public concern, which is essential for self-
governance). 
 160.  Post, supra note 43, 1827. 
 161.  Id. at 1717. 
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Thus, as noted above, public streets and parks (mainly due to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s dicta in its primordial public forum case Hague v. CIO162) 
have been considered traditional public forums, with other public property 
be labeled as either designated public forums or limited/nonpublic forums 
depending on how the government intended them to be used.163 However, 
Post laments that the rapid construction of public forum doctrine has led 
“toward the conclusion that the government’s actions within [a] public forum 
are simply subject to the same first amendment restraints as are government 
actions generally.”164 For Post, this conclusion offers little in the way of 
constitutional justification for the categorization of and application of 
concomitant levels of review to various types of government property. 
Therefore, for the sake of doctrinal uniformity, Post offers an 
alternative theory. The heart of Post’s argument is that public forum doctrine 
should be “concern[ed] with the nature of [government’s] managerial 
authority” over a certain forum, “rather than with the character of the 
government property.”165 Post’s theory appears to adequately explain forum 
delegation in the context of public colleges and universities. In particular, it 
is consistent with the reasonableness standard that courts have applied to 
public universities’ policies regarding the use of limited or nonpublic 
forums. Expressed in terms consistent with Post’s model, such policies of 
public universities essentially involve “government action within 
organizational domains [that] is at times designed for the specific purpose of 
facilitating symbolic interaction.”166 Indeed, Post singles out Widmar v. 
Vincent, the Court’s first case involving public forum doctrine at public 
universities, as “plainly recogniz[ing] that the university was invested with 
managerial authority to regulate speech as necessary for the attainment of 
institutional ends”: its educational mission.167 This approach does not mean 
that government entities would enjoy unfettered discretion on who gets to 
use the forums under their control. Rather, constitutional scrutiny would be 
invoked, Post argues, “when members of the general public bring the scope 
of [the government’s] managerial authority into question.”168 Therefore, a 
constitutional prohibition would be triggered “when an institution permits 
selective access to members of the public for reasons other than the 
achievement of legitimate institutional ends.”169 Such state action would 
 
 162.  See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 S. Ct. 954 (1939); see supra 
notes 39-54 and accompanying text. 
 163.  Post, supra note 43, at 1756. 
 164.  Id. at 1776. 
 165.  Id. at 1781. 
 166.  Id, at 1799. 
 167.  Id. at 1779. 
 168.  Post, supra note 43, at 1781. 
 169.  Id. at 1827. 
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threaten the goals of the domain of the public—which Post calls the domain 
of “governance”170 in the context of public forum doctrine to refer to the role 
of public forums in effectuating democratic self-governance.171 
Post’s theory appears to run into hurdles when applied to traditional 
public forums, thereby jeopardizing the formation of the concept of forum 
delegation. Indeed, Post writes, “The line between governance and 
management corresponds to the distinction between the public and nonpublic 
forum.”172 Furthermore, Post writes, “The accommodation of the conflicting 
objectives to which we subject our streets [and parks] is a matter of public 
governance, and hence must be evaluated according to the constitutional 
principles appropriate for such governance.”173 However, these hurdles are 
not necessarily insurmountable when it comes to applying forum delegation. 
Indeed, Post’s theory is designed to give explanatory power to doctrinal 
boundaries regarding when the government can engage in content 
discrimination when managing the sheer ability of speakers to use its forums. 
Post offers the example of a public prison being required to allow all possible 
religious groups into its facilities to offer religious education to inmates, but 
the prison would have a penological (i.e., managerial) interest in preventing 
a group advocating for illegal drug use from entering the prison while 
allowing Alcoholics Anonymous to speak to inmates.174 Meanwhile, the 
question of which of its traditional public forums a government can allow a 
speaker to use is more appropriately conceived as a function of management 
rather than governance. In other words, this function of management 
precedes the function of governance. 
Using this premise as a starting point, we can rely on Post’s conception 
of the type of review that should be used to balance the goals of management 
and governance to assess the validity of forum delegation: 
 
If an institutional objective is of sufficient importance, and if the 
appropriation of a public resource [such as a public forum] is 
sufficiently necessary to the attainment of the objective, first 
amendment principles may well permit rights of free expression 
respecting the resource to be subordinated in carefully limited 
kinds of ways . . . [so long as] this subordination will always be 
provisional, the result of hard-fought clarification of competing 
public values.175 
 
 170.  Id. at 1784. 
 171.  Id. at 1794. 
 172.  Id. at 1833. 
 173.  Post, supra note 43, at 1794. 
 174.  Id. at 1826. 
 175.  Id. at 1789-90 (internal citations omitted). 
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Thus, Post’s theory offers a valid alternative for strict scrutiny to assess 
the validity of forum delegation. Strict scrutiny would apply in the event that 
a city would try to deny a speaker access to a forum. However, because 
forum delegation merely involves a city’s suggestion of which of its many 
forums a speaker would be able to use, a review of the substantial 
government interests (similar to the standard of reasonable interests in the 
context of public universities), would be required to assess the 
constitutionality of such a suggestion. 
 The flowchart featured in Error! Reference source not found. 
below—modeled after the flowchart for public universities depicted in 
Error! Reference source not found.—shows how forum delegation could 
be applied to cities that manage multiple traditional public forums using 
Post’s suggested standard of review. Like a public university, a city would 
first have to determine whether it has multiple forums of comparable size, 
which, as with universities, is a luxury that many cities may not have. If it 
does, then the city would systematically progress through the same criteria 
as a public university to justify forum delegation: whether the speaker 
requires a high level of security; whether the change of forum would alleviate 
the security concern; and whether moving the venue would harm speaker’s 
ability to deliver his or her message to an intended audience. As with 
universities, cities should be prepared to document (for the purpose of filing 
affidavits during an appeals process) justification for each step made in their 
decision-making process. The last criterion—whether moving the venue 
would harm speaker’s ability to deliver his or her message to an intended 
audience—adds a new wrinkle to the analysis compared to the application of 
this model to public universities: in cities, it may be more likely that the 
forum that the speaker seeks to use, itself, may be integral to his or her 
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message. As will be shown below, this issue was very much in play in the 
Charlottesville case. 
Figure 2: Decision Flowchart for Forum Delegation in Cities 
 
As with the flowchart involving public universities, a city would be 
required to afford speakers due process to challenge the city’s decision to 
move the forum. As with universities, a cost-effective solution would be to 
create an independent channel for dispute resolution outside of the state or 
federal court system. Such a channel could be modeled after the City of 
Chicago’s two-step system for resolving disputes over the denial of permits 
to use the city’s parks, which the Supreme Court saw as dispositive in 
upholding the constitutionality of the city’s permit system from a challenge 
based on unbridled discretion.176 If the speakers prevailed, they would be 




 176.  Thomas v. Chicago Parks District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002) (“These grounds are 
reasonably specific and objective, and do not leave the decision to the whim of the 
administrator. . . . They provide narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards to guide 
the licensor’s determination, . . . [a]nd they are enforceable on review—first by appeal to the 
General Superintendent of the Park District, . . . and then by writ of common-law certiorari in 
the Illinois courts, . . . which provides essentially the same type of review as that provided by 
the Illinois administrative procedure act.”) (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
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B. Some Hurdles 
Before applying forum delegation to a counterfactual analysis of the 
Charlottesville case, a few doctrinal hurdles need to be overcome to 
successful transpose forum delegation from the public university setting to 
the municipal setting. The first involves the distinction in the category of 
forums involved in each context: nonpublic versus traditional public forums, 
respectively. At first blush, it may appear that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
already precluded the use of forum delegation in traditional public forums. 
In Schneider v. State, Justice Owen Roberts noted that “the streets are natural 
and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one 
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places 
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”177 
However, it is important to put these words in the context of this particular 
case. Schneider involved a consolidation of four cases in which municipal 
ordinances against littering were cited to prevent individuals from 
distributing leaflets and handbills in traditional public forums such as streets 
and parks. Two of those cases involved ordinances that allowed individuals 
to distribute literature in parks, but not on public streets or in alleys. This 
distinction in where distribution of leaflets would be allowed is what 
prompted Justice Roberts’ words above. However, the notion of forum 
delegation adopted from the UMN case is distinguishable from the two 
unconstitutional ordinances in Schneider. The Court struck down these 
ordinances because the cities had not offered a significant interest that would 
be furthered if the handbill distributors were moved to a different venue.178 
In other words, the ordinance did not survive strict scrutiny. A policy of 
suggesting where a speaker should be allowed to speak, born out of a 
substantial government interest in minimizing violence and reducing 
security costs, would arguably not face the same problem. 
Next, as noted above, the Eighth Circuit held in the Bowman case that 
public universities were less able than cities or other government entities 
from using police powers to summon a security presence for controversial 
speakers on short notice.179 Although such a relative distinction may be true, 
cities do not have unlimited budgets upon which to draw to summon security 
for controversial speakers. Thus, resource management can still be 
considered an important interest that cities should be allowed to factor into 
their management of forums. However, the threshold of the amount of 
security costs that cities could cite to justify forum delegation could (and 
perhaps should) be higher than for public universities. For example, if a city 
has already exhausted its annual overtime budget for police officers by the 
 
 177.  308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
 178.  Id. at 160. 
 179.  See note 124 and accompanying text. 
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time a controversial speaker seeks to use a city’s forums, then the city’s 
interest in resource management could be considered more significant. 
Finally, there is the problem of being able to predict with certainty that 
a controversial speaker or event will lead to violence, especially months 
before an event is scheduled. Furthermore, the violence would need to be 
caused as much (if not more so) by sympathizers of a speaker or attendees 
of an event rather than by counter-protesters, lest a heckler’s veto scenario 
appear to threaten the validity of attempts to move an event from one forum 
to another. The application of forum delegation to the Charlottesville case 
below will highlight that problem. However, as it was argued above in 
relation to the UMN case,180 because forum delegation does not involve 
denying a speaker the right to speak, but rather involves the mere ability of 
a city to suggest where he or she speaks, the heckler’s veto doctrine would 
not apply. 
 
C. Charlottesville Counterfactual 
White nationalists gathered in Charlottesville, Virginia on August 11 
and 12, 2017. One of their expressed goals was to protest the city’s removal 
of a statue of William E. Lee at a public park, whose name would be changed 
from Lee Park to Emancipation Park.181 The rally turned violent on August 
12 when white nationalists clashed with counterprotesters. The clashes left 
at least 34 people wounded, and 32-year-old counterprotester Heather Heyer 
was killed when James Alex Fields, Jr., drove his car into a crowd of 
counterprotesters.182 Two state troopers, H. Jay Cullen and Berke M. M. 
Bates, were also killed when their helicopter crashed as they were monitoring 
the demonstrations.183 The events of Charlottesville spurred an intense 
national debate on racism, domestic terrorism and freedom of speech in 
America at a time when many believe that white nationalists feel more 
emboldened than ever.184 The events even prompted Professor and First 
Amendment scholar Rod Smolla to existentially ask at a conference in 
August 2018, “My God, what has my life’s work wrought?”185 
 
 180.  See supra Part I.D.1. 
 181.  Maggie Astor, Christina Caron and Daniel Victor, A Guide to the Charlottesville 
Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlott 
esville-virginia-overview.html. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  See, e.g., Liam Stack, Over 1,000 Hate Groups Are Now Active in United States, 
Civil Rights Group Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20 
/us/hate-groups-rise.html. 
 185.  PF&R Panel Session: “True Threats, Hate Speech and the Rise of Trump in America 
– Does the First Amendment Protect Too Much ‘Offensive’ Speech?”, Ass’n for Ed. in 
Journalism and Mass Comm. Annual Conference, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 9, 2018, 1:45 PM). 
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Presciently, a few days before the demonstrations, officials in 
Charlottesville sought to prophylactically quell the violence they were 
expecting. On August 7, 2017, the city informed Kessler that it was 
modifying the permit that it had granted to Kessler on June 13, 2017, by 
requiring him to hold his demonstration in the much larger McIntire Park 
rather than in Emancipation Park.186 Kessler filed for injunctive relief on 
August 10, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia. On August 11, 2017, Judge Glen E. Conrad granted Kessler’s 
motion and reinstated his permit to hold the rally in Emancipation Park.187 
The city had contended that its decision to move the rally was based on 
evidence (mainly gleaned from social media) that holding the event at 
Emancipation park would present major security concerns.188 However, 
Judge Conrad called the city’s evidence “circumstantial,”189 and held that 
“merely moving Kessler’s demonstration to another park will not avoid a 
clash of ideologies or prevent confrontation between” Kessler’s supporters 
and his opponents.190 Rather, Judge Conrad held that the city would face 
worse security concerns by moving the event given that supporters and 
opponents of Kessler would surely demonstrate in both McIntire Park and 
Emancipation Park.191 In the end, the city won a pyrrhic victory by being 
right about the extent of the violence. 
Most likely, the “eleventh-hour” nature of Charlottesville’s attempt to 
move Kessler’s rally was its critical flaw. If the city had tried to move the 
event immediately after receiving Kessler’s application for use of 
Emancipation Park, could it have survived constitutional scrutiny? Let’s 
walk through the flowchart in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Charlottesville satisfied the first criterion: it had a venue of larger size to 
offer Kessler and his sympathizers. Assuming that the city would have had 
intelligence earlier on in the process to know with reasonable certainty that 
the event would lead to violence, it could have satisfied the second and third 
criteria as well. 
However, a much more difficult problem arises regarding the criterion 
that moving the event from one forum to another would not harm the ability 
of the speakers to deliver their message. Professor Amanda Reid has argued 
that place is often central to a speaker’s message, offering the phenomena of 
roadside memorials as examples of people using a place as an essential 
means to communicate their message of remembrance of the deceased, or 
 
 186.  Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, Va., No. 17-CV-00056, WL 3474071 (W.D. Vir. 
Aug. 11, 2017) at *1. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at *3. 
 190.  Id. at *2. 
 191.  Kessler, WL 3474071 at *2. 
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even the more political message of criticism of road conditions or American 
driving culture.192 Reid notes that arguments can be made that state and local 
officials have significant legal grounds for removing these memorials out of 
concern for safety (e.g., the memorials might distract drivers, causing more 
accidents),193 or because of Establishment Clause concerns (e.g., the 
presence of a cross in a public place memorializing a traffic death could 
convey the notion that the state is endorsing a Christian message).194 
However, Reid also notes that a compelling argument can be made that 
forced removal of these memorials would dilute their message, given the 
significance of the place as the last location where a loved-one was alive, 
thereby making “other rituals and other avenues for expression [of 
memorializing the dead] inadequate.”195 
The essential nexus between place and message that Reid highlights—
and the concomitant constitutional concerns that arise out of trying to break 
that nexus—can be extended to the issue of controversial groups seeking to 
express a message in a specific location. In the Charlottesville case, Kessler’s 
group sought to protest the removal of the statue of Robert E. Lee from the 
public forum that they sought to use. In spite of the security concerns of 
holding the rally in Emancipation Park (even assuming city officials had 
identified the concerns far earlier than they did in the actual case), moving 
the rally could have diluted Kessler’s message. To compare this case to a 
hypothetical example, a controversial speaker opposed to a new city 
ordinance may wish to protest in front of City Hall, and thus moving the 
speaker to a more open park a few miles away from City Hall would dampen 
the speaker’s message. Or, to take another historical case, because the 
Village of Skokie, Illinois was heavily populated with Jews—and, in 
particular, Holocaust survivors—marching in the city’s main town square 
was central to the message of Frank Collin and the National Socialist Party 
of America.196 As repugnant as the group’s message may have been, an 
argument could be made that moving the Nazis to the outskirts of the town 
could have dampened their message. 
However, this hurdle is not necessarily insurmountable. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of content neutral time, 
place, and manner restrictions of speech in cases where the venue and means 
of expression were central to the speakers’ message. In Clark v. Community 
 
 192.  Amanda Reid, Place, Meaning, and the Visual Argument of the Roadside Cross, 2 
SAVANNAH L. REV. 265 (2015); Amanda Reid, Private Memorials on Public Space: Roadside 
Crosses at the Intersection of the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause, 92 NEB. 
L. REV. 124 (2013). 
 193.  Reid, Place, Meaning, and the Visual Argument of the Roadside Cross, at 278. 
 194.  Id. at 298. 
 195.  Id. at 283. 
 196.  Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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for Creative Non-Violence, the Court held that a prohibition on camping on 
National Park property (such as the National Mall) was a constitutional 
content-neutral restriction on speech, despite the fact that it impinged 
directly on a group’s means of protesting the plight of the homeless: erecting 
a tent city on the National Mall.197 The Court held that the federal 
government’s interest in maintaining the beauty of the Mall was a 
sufficiently significant interest to allow the prohibition to survive 
constitutional review.198 Therefore, if forum delegation can be considered a 
content-neutral time, place and manner restriction on speech, provided it is 
triggered by a substantial government interest in maintaining security at 
reasonable costs, then the incidental impingement upon the central message 
of the speaker could be deemed constitutional. However, this condition 
likely will not be categorically settled in any given situation involving forum 
delegation. Indeed, it likely will be the central focus of litigation, or, at the 
very least, an appeals process. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to explicate and develop the concept 
of forum delegation—the process by which a government entity could 
constitutionally manage which forum, among the several public forums 
under its control, a speaker can use to deliver a message. The concept is born 
out of the University of Minnesota’s (arguably) constitutional decision to 
move a speak by Ben Shapiro from one venue on its large campus to another. 
Its application is meant to be limited in nature. It would apply only to 
situations when the risk of violence sparked by a controversial speaker is 
reasonably certain, when multiple forums of comparable size are available 
for a government entity to choose from, and when moving the speaker would 
further a substantial interest in quelling violence. Forum delegation involves 
merely a suggestion by government officials on which of its forums it would 
allow a speaker to use. Therefore, the process of forum delegation falls 
within Professor Robert Post’s domain of management—government’s 
ability to control how it uses its property to achieve legitimate institutional 
ends—rather than the domain of governance, whereby traditional First 
Amendment principles of strict scrutiny would apply. 
Forum delegation is not designed to be a panacea. Counterfactual 
analysis of the litigation surrounding the Unite the Right rally in 
Charlottesville suggests that forum delegation could have survived 
constitutional scrutiny had it been applied early in the process of reviewing 
organizers’ application for use of the city’s parks. However, the close nexus 
between the speakers’ message and their preferred forum (Emancipation 
 
 197.  Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 198.  Id. at 296. 
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Park) could have negated the city’s efforts to move speakers to a larger park, 
where law enforcement would have faced fewer difficulties in containing 
violence between speakers and counter-protesters. If a government entity’s 
efforts do survive constitutional scrutiny, the main benefit of forum 
delegation is that interests of all stakeholders involved can be balanced: 
speakers get to speak, audience members get to hear, counter-protesters get 
to counter-speak, violence is mitigated, and a university’s/city’s costs for 
security can be held to reasonable levels. If the attempts to delegate forum 
use do not survive constitutional scrutiny, government officials can at the 
very least claim a public relations victory by showing that, through following 
the criteria suggested above, they sought to balance the competing interests 
of promoting freedom of expression and protecting the safety of community 
members. Such a claim is not insignificant. Indeed, it can offer a powerful 
rhetorical tool to restore public confidence in freedom of expression at a time 
when extremist groups plow ahead with their strategy of “weaponizing” the 
First Amendment to sow social discord through the polarization of free-
speech principles.199 
Certainly, the development of the concept of forum delegation into a 
potential doctrine is far from finished. At the very least, the proposals put 
forth in this paper have opened up the discussion surrounding this concept. 
With this opening salvo, it is hoped that scholars will continue to vigorously 
debate the theoretical and doctrinal principles underlying the concept, as 
only through such debate can a novel idea such as forum delegation have the 
















 199.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Weaponizing the First Amendment: How Free Speech 
Became a Conservative Cudgel, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20 
18/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.html. 
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